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Abstract: In recent years, machine learning (ML) has become an important part to yield security
and privacy in various applications. ML is used to address serious issues such as real-time attack
detection, data leakage vulnerability assessments and many more. ML extensively supports the
demanding requirements of the current scenario of security and privacy across a range of areas such
as real-time decision-making, big data processing, reduced cycle time for learning, cost-efficiency
and error-free processing. Therefore, in this paper, we review the state of the art approaches where
ML is applicable more effectively to fulfill current real-world requirements in security. We examine
different security applications’ perspectives where ML models play an essential role and compare,
with different possible dimensions, their accuracy results. By analyzing ML algorithms in security
application it provides a blueprint for an interdisciplinary research area. Even with the use of current
sophisticated technology and tools, attackers can evade the ML models by committing adversarial
attacks. Therefore, requirements rise to assess the vulnerability in the ML models to cope up with the
adversarial attacks at the time of development. Accordingly, as a supplement to this point, we also
analyze the different types of adversarial attacks on the ML models. To give proper visualization of
security properties, we have represented the threat model and defense strategies against adversarial
attack methods. Moreover, we illustrate the adversarial attacks based on the attackers’ knowledge
about the model and addressed the point of the model at which possible attacks may be committed.
Finally, we also investigate different types of properties of the adversarial attacks.
Keywords: security; privacy; adversarial attack; machine learning; attackers’ knowledge
1. Introduction
The present-day community accesses advanced technologies, both hardware, and software, at
an unprecedented pace in possibly every imaginable field. However, this has resulted in a whole new
range of threats in terms of privacy and security. Therefore, there is a demanding need to address the
security and privacy perspective of different types of cyber threats which are increasing at a drastic pace
with unknown malware [1]. According to a special report [2], out of seven billion population in the
world, about six billion rely on mobile phones or other smart gadgets for banking, shopping, financing,
healthcare, internet-of-things (IoT), blockchain applications, posts on social media and for professional
information and updates [3–7]. Therefore, during downloading of the applications on smart devices,
there is a strong chance of data leakage and theft. Apart from that, malware is also triggered by corrupt
system routines, unauthorized network access to resources and gather sensitive information. To cope
up with these issues, many anti-virus tools, intrusion detection systems [8], defenders, and latest
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firewalls with updated security patches are available. However, according to the aforementioned
report [9], malware distribution continues to grow at more than 267% per annum worldwide.
From the security perspective, the core research is focused on (1) dynamic vulnerability analysis;
(2) static vulnerability analysis and; (3) hybrid vulnerability analysis. Even though static vulnerability
analysis techniques have agility, it generates a high false-positive rate which shows less accuracy [10].
Meanwhile, dynamic vulnerability analysis techniques are accurate, but only for the substantial system.
At the same time, accuracy gets compromised while adopting these techniques. Hybrid techniques
attempt to overcome both these issues addressed in static and dynamic techniques. However, hybrid
techniques are able to detect new types of vulnerabilities [11]. In recent times, hardware and software
vendors have introduced many new techniques such as data execution protection, space layouts
randomization, structured exception handler overwriting protection [12] and mandatory integrity
control [13]. We claim that current evasion techniques can be easily bypassed and vendors are still in
a developing phase in order to handle severe sophisticated attacks.
Recently some surveys on security applications in the context of machine learning and artificial
intelligence have been presented [8] ML techniques for cybersecurity with an emphasis on ML methods
and their description. Many other papers represented these methods have been published including
many reviews. Also, previous works either focus on adversarial techniques or defense techniques of
the machine learning classifiers. While this paper target work comparison of security applications as
well as adversarial aspects including its defense techniques also during every phase of the machine
learning life cycle from a data-driven view. The fundamental difference between previous surveys
which have been proposed by authors, most of them only involve only security threats, internal
issues of the machine learning systems in terms of adversarial defense. While in this survey based
on that circumstance this survey combines different security applications and studies and carries
out comprehensive summery in terms of tables based on the various parameters. Also, this survey
highlights adversarial attack properties and attacks defense techniques for security applications in
which ML plays an essential role. We emphasize a detailed review of security application with its
performance matrices comparison as well as data distribution drifting leads by adversarial samples and
private information transgression problem and its defense with attack model. This survey, as a complete
summary combines numerous references and provides a macro understanding and interrelationship
of security applications and machine learning related fields. This paper is intended for readers who
wish to begin research towards the field of security application using ML techniques. As such great
emphasis is placed on the thorough description is given about security application as well as the
adversarial setting during the ML lifecycle.
With the explosion of data accelerating at an exponential rate, the privacy of data and systems has
also come into the foreground. Privacy can be seen as one with a wide scope under a big umbrella [14].
In applications such as banking, healthcare, and defense, not only the issues related to privacy is
a serious concern, but also there are legal concerns that need to be considered as mentioned in the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability (HIPAA) act [15]. Within the current technological
scenario, there is a well-known discipline called privacy-preserving’ [13] and statistical disclosure
control (SDC) [16]. When data is distributed, preserving privacy becomes more challenging. Some
of the statistical disclosure control techniques which address risks related to data disclosure [17] and
privacy-preserving techniques in the frame of signature-based detection are not really foolproof [18].
In order to preserve data privacy, it becomes imperative to address the issues concerning the balance
between false-negative rate, false-positive rate, recall, precision and performance [19].
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 states survey methodology which
describes the taxonomy of the security applications and based on that how survey criteria forms.
Section 3 reviews and analyzes different types of security applications for which ML approaches can
be applied in order to prevent security threats on the applications. Apart from this, Section 3 gives
complete information about all types of performance metrics used in the approaches of IDS with the
type of different type classifiers with algorithms, limitations and future challenges. Section 4 presents
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a vulnerability analysis threat model different types of adversarial attacks at each level on the ML
classifiers from different types of attackers. Also, we review adversarial defense techniques for the
different types of adversarial attacks that cover both reactive and proactive types of defense techniques.
2. Survey Methodology for Security Applications
The idea behind conducting a survey is deceptively simple which involves identifying different
types of application where machine learning classifier is involved in the applications. This section
introduces a taxonomy of different security applications where machine learning can be applied in
order to fulfill the desired goal. Several survey machines learning-based survey papers have been
proposed but most of them address security-based issues in machine learning applications. Therefore,
considering the above circumstances, this survey in addition to that also includes privacy with security
aspects and adversarial attacks on machine learning classifiers.
To design the survey for the security-based application we divide the security spectrum
comprehensively into different applications which include the comprehensive method analysis
for the application in all aspects of security. Also, we expand the spectrum in terms of the type of
classifiers where it requires analyzing especially for intrusion detection as well as prevention. Although
the scope of the security applications is broad which can not be limited for few applications in the recent
technological advancement. In this survey, we have considered security applications in which machine
learning plays a vital and essential role in security applications. Because ML algorithms comprise
and designated for statistical mechanisms such as decision tree, logistic regression, and function
approximations. This type of algorithm is more influential and can be used in that type of situation
where classification is essential. The machine learning technique imposes many advantages especially
when it applied in security aspects like (1) signature-based attack where subtle changes in the signature
can be discovered dynamically, (2) system behavior and identify anomaly from the deviation of the
normal system, (3) by stabilizing biased variance, recall verses precision machine learning provides
lower sensitivity and reduces false alarm rate, (4) machine learning is highly recommended when the
domain of the threat model is changed.
2.1. Study Selections and Search Methods
The study selection process for the survey includes mainly three phases: (1) title and abstract review,
(2) classification of security applications, (3) review of security properties and defense techniques.
Inclusion criteria for a title and abstract review are security applications where machine learning
methods are applicable, weakness of ML models where attackers craft the attacks and identify the
methods to defend the attacks. In the second phase of the review process, selection criteria of the
survey described are base on machine learning in security applications. Based on the inclusion criteria
total of one hundred fourteen papers satisfy the inclusion criteria and classified according to presume
array of variables. In the third phase of the review process selection criteria of the survey describe
based on “Adversarial attacks on machine learning and defense”. Based on these inclusion criteria
total of twenty-three papers satisfies the inclusion criteria.
For the survey, bibliographic databases are explored using an online search interface for paper
selection. To achieve precise relevancy to the title in Table 1 we have described the query format for
searching through interfaces.
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Table 1. Search queries format for search engine.
Search Engine Query
IEEE Xplore (machine learning AND applications AND security) OR(Adversarial Attacks AND machine learning) 1
Springer
(machine learning AND applications AND security) OR
(security properties OR defense AND machine learning)
OR (adversarial attacks AND machine learning) 2
Web of Science
(machine learning AND application AND security) OR
(security properties OR defense AND machine learning)
OR (adversarial attacks AND machine learning) 2
Science Direct
(machine learning AND application AND security) OR
(security properties OR defense AND machine learning)
OR (adversarial attacks AND machine learning) 2
1 Searched in Metadata; 2 Search topics filtered by subjects: Computer Science; Security Applications; Privacy;
Machine Learning; Adversarial attacks.
2.2. Variable Definitions
In this review, variables are considered based on general characterization, security properties,
and adversarial analysis. Table 2 characterizes detail criteria regarding study characterization, type of
algorithm used for modeling, type of metric used for result analysis, consideration of data acquisition
techniques for classifiers training and testing, and type of application approach. While, as per the
adversarial point of view, detailed criteria regarding types of security property consists of an existing
approach and defense strategy used for the approach. In Table 2 all criteria are represented in the
respective sub-sections.
Table 2. Types of variables considered for paper selection during the review.
Variable Explanation
Study
Year Publication year
Type of Study Rationale regarding outcome analysis
Problems Rationale of problem identification, address, and solution
Security applications
Methodology Types of machine learning algorithms used in the approach
Type of classifier Which type of classifiers are adopted for simulation
Performance metrics Types of performance metrics and accuracy achieved
Data acquisition Type of datasets are used in training and testing
Application approach wether security applications anomaly, misuse or hybriddetections based approach used
Adversarial analysis
Security properties Type of security property consists of the existing approach
Defense approach Which type of defense approach
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2.3. Time Period Considered
In order to analyze the research trends of machine learning in security applications and adversarial
attacks, we have divided the time period into five different intervals. We have considered the time
period range first interval from 2016 to 2019, for the second interval from 2011 to 2015, for the third
interval from 2006 to 2010, for the fourth interval from 2001 to 2005 and for the fifth interval from 2000
and below.
2.4. Studies Characterization
This subsection represents the statistical results retrieved from the search methods and types of
variables considered in the variable definition criteria. Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of published
papers for the last 25 years. In the graph, the time period of total years is represented in five different
intervals. The result represents an increasing trend of machine learning methods in security applications
and adversarial attack techniques. It is observed in Figure 1 where activity in the machine learning
domain is increased since 2006. Apart from this in the period 2016–2019 flourishing trend of the
published papers in the area of machine learning-based security applications and adversarial attacks.
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The taxonomy of security applications where machine learning is applied is illustrated in Figure 2.
• Intrusion can be separately classified into intrusion detection and intrusion prevention techniques.
Further intrusion detection can be classified into an anomaly-based and signature-based approach.
1. Anomaly-based intrusion detection detects misuse in a computer or network with the help
of machine learning classifiers either normal or anomalous.
2. While signature-based detection is identified by the ML classifiers algorithms by identifying
specific patterns such as malicious instruction sequences or byte sequences.
• Intrusion prevention is a preemptive approach that identifies potential threats with the help of
ML classifiers and responds to them accordingly in order to prevent misuse.
• Phishing detection intended to detect legiti ate or phishing web pages and applications which
mainly exploit computer users’ vulnerability with t e use of ML classifiers.
• Privacy preservation is another important aspect of security where in order to provide security of
sensitive information during communication between different parties. Here ML classifiers help
to prevent leakage of the sensitive data with other collaborative entities. Linear Means classifier
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simply computes a multiple of the original LM score function with the same sign and algorithm
made confidential by encoding all real vector coefficients as integers and encrypts the input
vectors coefficient wise and carries out the linear algebra operations with vectors of ciphertexts.
While Fisher’s Linear Discriminant Classifier same procedure is done like LM classifiers but using
gradient descent using different weight vector.
• Spam detections like blatant blocking, bulk email filter, category filter, null sender header tag
validation, and null sender disposition ML classifiers are used.
Electronics 2019, 8, x FOR PEER REVIEW 6 of 41 
 
 
Figure 2. Taxonomy of Security Applications. 
• Malware detection, ML classifier formalizes and finds the principals that inhibit the data it 
examines. If a previously unseen sample is found then it could be the new file and based on 
the properties it contains the decision has been taken about malware detection. Based on the 
type of the signature we categorize malware detection techniques into signature-based 
detection, anomaly-based detection, heuristics based detection. 
• Testing Security properties require to ensure the safety and authenticity of the protocol 
systems. In order to model the testing process in an automated manner, using three 
techniques namely black-box checking, passive trace minimization, and fuzz testing to fulfill 
the desired goal of testing security.  
  
Figure 2. Taxonomy of Security Applications.
Electronics 2020, 9, 97 7 of 42
Risk assessment is also an important factor which classifies different information assets that
possibly damaged and identify various risk that could affect the assets with the help of ML classifiers.
• Malware detection, ML classifier formalizes and finds the principals that inhibit the data it
examines. If a previously unseen sample is found then it could be the new file and based on
the properties it contains the decision has been taken about malware detection. Based on the
type of the signature we categorize malware detection techniques into signature-based detection,
anomaly-based detection, heuristics based detection.
• Testing Security properties require to ensure the safety and authenticity of the protocol systems.
In order to model the testing process in an automated manner, using three techniques namely
black-box checking, passive trace minimization, and fuzz testing to fulfill the desired goal of
testing security.
3. Machine Learning Applications in Security
3.1. Intrusion Detection and Prevention
In recent years, Internet service has played an important part in business models. Since both the
customer and the business use Internet applications, the security of data while utilizing the Internet as
a medium has become a prime concern [20]. The intrusion detection system (IDS) provides a defense to
counter the attacks [21,22]. In IDS, several approaches are proposed such as packet payload analysis [23],
pattern propagation [24] and bro language [25]. In addition, various schemes for ad-hoc networks are
proposed to detect attack patterns and to provide a defense mechanism in the network [26–30]. IDS
which are passive by nature have a key issue their inability to mount targeted, reliable and adaptive
response [31]. Therefore, sometimes host-level IDS does not assure how a packet is processed which
may lead to wrong decisions [32] and that is why the adaptive and proactive system is required over
IDS. In [33], the authors state anomaly-based and signature-based approaches for IDS as follows.
3.1.1. Intrusion Detection System Approaches
In this Segment, we review types of approaches for IDS. In the IDS, essential factors cause of error
in classifier learning due to noise, bias, and variance. Therefore, ensemble and hybrid classifiers are
the types of multiclass classifiers that help to minimize these factors due to the bagging, boosting and
stacking properties in the classifier models. Based on these criteria we have analyzed a signature-based
and anomaly-based approach.
Signature-Based Approach
A signature-based intrusion detection technique uses a pre-defined pattern to identify malicious
activity [21] while in the traditional methods, it may not be able to intimate the system about new threats.
1. Single classifier
In this type of intrusion detection technique, only a single ML algorithm is used to detect the
intrusion. Akira et al. [34] proposed a decision tree algorithm with the Gini index, which engenders
refined data that are used to learn the classifiers for raising the alerts as an output of signature-based
IDS. Lippmann et al. [35] represent a theory that detects the signature of a known attack by examining
attack-oriented basic keywords in the network. Network sniffing data are used to produce the count
of the keywords in each telnet session. Counting of each keyword occurrences is used for detection
by the neural network classifier. Wong et al. [36] illustrated an artificial neural network (ANN) as
well as a support vector-based classifier approach to predict the types of attacks, which are based on
frequency-based encoding techniques. ANN is trained with the backpropagation algorithm to predict
the intrusion. Additionally, a support vector machine (SVM) model is also built in order to classify
attack. From the observation of both techniques, it shows that SVM gives better results than ANN for
the same encoding method of detection.
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2. Hybrid classifier
This type of classifier primarily a blend of the heterogeneous environment or/and classifiers
as a detection mechanism in which right from the data normalization phase to the final decision
phase is covered. Borges et al. [37] presented a communication control module, a monitoring module,
a mobile correlator module and, command and control center (C&C) components described to which
the command and control center (C&C) center consists of a hybrid classifier. The monitoring module is
responsible for monitoring normal and abnormal patterns for file access and usage, content observer
and a broadcast receiver. All the information thus gathered is used afterward by the ML classifiers
to access if any user or mobile device’s application face any security threats. Karthick et al. [38]
presented a two-stage framework: the first stage naïve Bayes classifier is employed to raise a flag
that identifies malicious activities in the network and incoming traffic fed as an input to the hidden
Markov model (HMM). HMM is an effective approach to blacklist IP addresses based on suspicious
characteristics of the traffic. The plot model [36] proposed by Tsai et al. [35] (triangle area-based nearest
neighbors) uses K-means clustering to conclude the cluster center corresponding to the attack classes.
Two cluster centers and one data among the datasets are used to calculate the area of the triangle and
form a signature from that K-Nearest Neighbour classifier which is employed to identify threats.
3. Ensemble Classifier
The ensemble is a combined classifier of multiple weak classifiers. In this method, weak learners
are trained so that the inclusive action of the model can be adequately alleviated. For improving
the performance of the weak learner, adaptive boosting [38], bagging [39], wagging [40], random
forest [41] and cross validators committees [42] play a crucial role. Ma et al. [43] proposed a scheme
that combines the deep neural network (DNN) and spectral clustering algorithms. Datasets are calved
into the K subsets using cluster centers. Based on the similarity features, distance is measured among
the data points in training sets and testing sets which are employed into the model of DNN to detect
the intrusion. In Table 3, we analyze different ML approaches for signature-based intrusion detection
applications for all three types of classifiers. Our criteria for Table 3 for signature-based intrusion
detection system based on which type of classifiers are used in the approach from above mentioned
three types of classifiers that is single, hybrid or ensemble classifier.
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Table 3. Analysis of Signature-based Intrusion Detection Techniques (Notations: SVM-Support Vector Machines, TANN-Triangle Area Based Nearest Neighbor).
Reference [34] [35] [36] [37] [38] [43] [44] [45]
Type Of Algorithm Decisiontree algorithm Neural network
Artificial Neural
network, SVM
k-means clusturing +
semi-supervised
Algorithm
Hidden Markow Model
+ Naïve Biase
Spectral
clustering +
Deep Neural
Network, SVM,
Random Forest,
Back
Propagation
Neural Network
Genetic Algorithm TANN, SVM,k-means + k-NN
Advantage No datapreparation required
Ability to detect
a new type of attack
with less
computation
Frequency-base
encoding is more
effective for
intrusion detection
Low impact on mobile
in terms of battery
consumption,
CPU/memory usage
Highly Accurate
Accuracy is
high for attack
detection, error
rate is low for all
tested data sets,
able to classify
sparse attacks
Adopts changes in
environment, robust
against noise and
detects unknown
types of attacks
Accuracy rate and
detection rate is
high for single class
Limitation and
challenge
False positives
found for known
attacks in defense
advance research
project agency
Stealthy attack
which hides the
keywords requires
additional action
Improper parameter
selection cause
overfitting in ANN
Selective policy
implemented for
monitoring
suspicious events
HMM requires more
than 5 states to
maintain high accuracy
Requires to
optimize weight
parameter and
threshold for
each DNN layer
Compared to rule
optimization method
false positive
rate is high
Low accuracy for
more than one class
Performance Metrics
True positives,
false positives,
false negatives,
true negatives
False alarms
Detection
Rate—80%
Attack detection
Rate—95.9%, false
positive rate
CPU usage, RAM
usage, battery usage,
sent/Received packets
Accuracy—100%, false
alarm rate
Accuracy—91.97%,
recall—92.23%,
error rate—7.9%
False positives and
intrusion detection
rate—99.6%
Accuracy—96.91%,
false positive rate,
detFalse positives
and intrusion
detection
rate—99.6% ection
rate—98.95%
Classifier type Single Single Single Hybrid Hybrid Ensemble Single Hybrid
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Anomaly-Based Approach
This type of technique observes the system behavior and identifies anomaly from the deviation
of the normal system. Hence, this type of system has the ability to detect the zero-day attack [32].
Using this technique normal behavior of the system can be customized so that, for the adversary, it is
difficult to figure out the normal behavior of the system. In Table 4, we investigated anomaly-based
IDS approaches based on the types of classifiers.
1. Single classifier
Van et al. [46] proposed a deep learning technique to implement an anomaly-based network
IDS (NIDS). In the proposed model, the deep belief network structure is constructed that consists
of components such as stacked auto-encoder and stacked restricted Boltzmann machines (RBM).
With the use of auto-encoder, the classifier learns and extracts hierarchical features by unsupervised or
semi-supervised learning. The RBM probabilistic model aims to use the natural criteria to maximize
the log-likelihood. Therefore, the proposed method can be enabled to detect attacks and classify them
into these classes: probe, user to root, normal, remote to user and denial-of-service (DoS). In [47],
the authors presented a scheme for creating intrusion database with the main objective to create
an easy-to-update database tool which simultaneously produces real traffic data. To make the ML
scheme effective, the proposed method is used as a multi-objective feature selection technique that
acknowledges substantial network characteristics that yield higher accuracy. Ghanem et al. [48] opined
that anomaly-based IDS aims to accomplish an excessive number of false alarms. They constructed
an SVM based-machine learning technique that complements the performance of the IDS and also
decreases the false alarm rate vigorously. In the performance assessment projected, the unsupervised
IDS approach detects all malicious traffic and reduces false alarms compared to one-class and two-class
linear and non-linear SVM approaches.
2. Hybrid classifier
Al-Yaseen et al. [49] illustrated a modified k-means algorithm that aims to achieve
high-performance and considers all possible eventualities by treating all the divergent points in
the datasets as the initial centroid of the cluster instead of selecting a specific set of initial centroid
randomly. In addition to this, the modified k-means clustering standard C4.5 technique [50] builds
a tree from the clusters which can detect the anomaly by using the maximum information gained from
the feature selection. Consequently, minimum information is split to build a tree structure of normal
and malicious behaviors. Abadeh et al. [51] proposed a parallel genetic local search algorithm that is
capable of generating fuzzy rules for detecting intrusive behavior in the networks. In this approach,
the population is divided into subpopulations, which are the number of classes for the classification
analysis or problem, and training set for each classifier is different from each other. The fuzzy ruleset
evolves independently in a parallel manner and is used as a source of knowledge for each classifier for
intrusion detection.
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Table 4. Analysis of Anomaly-based Intrusion Detection Techniques.
Reference [46] [47] [48] [49] [51] [52] [53]
Type of
Algorithm/Technique Deep learning
Decision tree,
naïve Bayes
Support
vector machine
Hybrid modified k-means + C
4.5, Bayes net, Naïve Bayes,
LibSVM, JRip, sequential
minimal optimization,
k Instance base
Genetic local
search algorithm
Parzen density
estimation, k-means,
v-SVC (Support
vector classifier)
Bagged tree, ada boost,
RUS boost, logit boost,
gentle boost
Advantage
Accuracy of intrusion
detection and attack
classification is high
Considered
real-world
network
properties to
increase accuracy
Datasets
comprise with
non-homogeneous
features, shows
high accuracy
Construct clusters with all
cases characterized by
significant differences among
the instance which leads to
higher accuracy
Needs less training
time, high detection
rate, low false
alarm rate
v-SVC algorithm
performs better than
its competitors, high
detection rate,
low false alarm rate,
accurately models the
traffic of each service
Provides comparative
study of ensemble ML
methods for
imbalance datasets
Limitation
and challenge
Training for stack
auto-encoder is
time-consuming
False-positive rate
increases while
detecting new
types of attacks
IDS accuracy
decreases when
analyzing the
probing datasets
Precision is less compared to
other methods like naïve
Bayes, J48 NB tree
Discovered trade-off
between false alarm
and detection rate
with the value of local
search procedure
False alarm rate is
increased when the
detection rate is
increased for
the approach
Needs to require
designing ML
algorithm variations
with all relevant
security issues
Performance Metrics Accuracy—99.98%,error rate—0.02%
False positives,
false negatives,
accuracy—97.42%
False-negative
rate—0%,
detection
rate—100%, false
positive rate—0%,
overall success
rate—100%
Accuracy—91.13%, detection
rate—85.26%, false alarm
rate—2.99%,
precision—96.65%,
specificity—97.01%,
F-measure—90.56%
Detection rate—92.4%,
classification
rate—93%, false alarm
rate—0.15%
Detection
rate—94.31%, false
alarm rate—9.49%
Sensitivity, specificity,
precision—99.3%,
Type of classifier Single Single Single Hybrid Hybrid Ensemble Ensemble
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3. Ensemble Classifier
Giacinto et al. [52] proposed an unlabelled network anomaly IDS based on the modular
multiple-classifier systems. The aim of this modularized design to develop a batch of homogeneous
network or protocol services that grant the designer to choose decision thresholds and different models
for the module to enhance the comprehensive performance of the ensemble model. For ensemble
classifiers, the posterior probability function is used on which min, max, mean and product rule can be
easily applied and, traditional classifiers can be combined using the rules for obtaining the detection
result. While [53] uses AdaBoost, RUSBoost, LogiBoost, and gentle boost Bagged tree algorithm for
ensemble classifiers and results are compared with each of the referred algorithms. As a result of these
algorithms, bagged tree and gentle boost classifiers show notable performance. In Table 4, we classify
anomaly-based intrusion detection techniques for the aforementioned different types of classifiers.
3.1.2. Intrusion Prevention
Intrusion prevention is a vulnerability prevention technique that monitors network flow to detect
and prevent dicey traffic misuse. Intrusion prevention is an extension of IDS however, both investigate
malicious activity in network traffic. One critical difference in intrusion prevention over intrusion
detection is that intrusion prevention is to construct and design more active protection to enhance
intrusion detection. This type of approach is most suitable where it is essential to react in realtime to
prevent or block malicious activities. In [54], the authors addressed the issue of cyber terrorism and
emphasized that the response and defense mechanism of any system must be robust, adaptive and
efficient. They proposed a genetic programming mechanism for the prohibition of cyber-crime. The
basic weapons of cyber-terrorists are a modified version of intrusion methods such as spoofing, email
bombs, data sniffing, parasites, worms, backdoors, DoS attacks [55], Trojan horse [56]. In the proposed
work, the authors used a genetic algorithm to investigate the issues with the use of Knowledge-Data
Discovery (KDD)-Cup dataset which was provided by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
laboratory and Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). With the use of homologous
crossover and machine coded linear genomes operator, the desired result has been found and they have
been able to detect and predict the malicious intrusions. The proposed hybrid approach of feedback
intrusion prevention system in [52] protects binary code injection attacks. It contains three main units:
(1) signature-based filtering scheme; (2) anomaly-based classifier and; (3) supervision framework.
The supervision framework utilizes instruction set randomization, which prevents the code injection
attacks and identifies malicious code, which can be used to learn the classifiers and filtering scheme as
feedback. Consequently, it is capable enough to refuse the zero-day attack or metamorphic types of
attacks by nature.
3.2. Phishing Detection
Phishing is a technique to steal personal and sensitive information of the victim by enticing the
users to visit a fake email or web pages to mimic the victim’s own page visual identity. Phishing attacks
cause damage to a victim’s personal and sensitive information by spoofing email [57], fake social
network accounts [58] and hacking [59]. To detect phishing attacks, many approaches have been
proposed such as DNS-based blacklist, automated individual whitelist, heuristic, and visual similarity
and, ML-based techniques. Out of all these, MLbased techniques can automatically detect zero-hour
attacks effectively on a large scale basis [60].
Xiao et al. [61] represent phishing attacks built on the semisupervised ML approach which is
implemented on a transductive support vector machine. For the feature extraction of the web page,
they used the document object model which also includes a gray histogram, color histogram and
spatial relationship among the subgraph to leverage the phishing detection including some web
image features. TSVM takes into consideration how the distribution information implicitly exhibits
large quantity unlabeled datasets that provide effective performance as compared to SVM. In [62],
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it was reported that solutions for discovering phishing attacks in the online mode, which are based
on state-of-art techniques, suffer from lack of accuracy. Therefore, authors addressed this issue with
the help of a neural network with reinforcement learning. In the preprocessing phase, features were
selected from each header, email text, URL and HTML content which are given as an input to feature
evaluation and reduction algorithm (FERA). This aims to decide a number of defense features to be
applied to the classification process and also accelerates the adaption process in the neural network.
The DNN is analyzed and online emails are classified. A reinforcement learning agent is used to
acknowledge diversity in the online datasets and to provide a decision about legitimate or phishing
emails. The proposed approach is shown to have a false positive rate of 1.8% and an accuracy of 98.6%.
Hamid et al. [63] formulated an approach for clustering techniques and email phishing detection
profiling. In the feature selection, information gain is used to give weight to the attribute for a set of
training feature vectors. For the profiling, a two-step clustering algorithm is developed to deal with
a large set of data for handling continuous and categorical data. In the primary stage, profiles are
generated based on the clustering algorithms’ prediction and therefore, a cluster represents the profile
of elements in the prediction of phishing emails. In the second stage, profiles are employed to train the
classification algorithm for predicting the unrecognized class labels from the input data. For emails
categorization, AdaBoost and sequential minimal optimization algorithm are used which are ensemble
type classifiers and, their performances vary different datasets and number of clusters.
Basnet et al. [64] discussed that the basic behavior of adversaries can be obtained through email
headers. Email filtering is divided into two types: (1) content-based filtering and; (2) origin-based
filtering. For feature selection, the authors used the wrapper-based feature selection method and
the correlation-based feature selection method. For searching into the feature subset within the time
constraint, as a result, they have presented a greedy forward search and genetic algorithm. They showed
that the wrapper-based feature selection method is slower related to correlation-based feature selection
while wrapper-based feature selection methods have better accuracy over the classifiers as compared
to the correlation feature selection method. The mentioned techniques with types of feature selection
sets can be bundled up into the classifiers that are shown in Table 5.
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Table 5. Analysis of phishing detection techniques (notations: feature extraction and reduction, CFS- correlation-based feature selection, WFS- Wrapper Feature
Selection).
References [63] [64] [65] [66] [67]
No. of Feature Sets 20 177 5 50 7
Feature
Selection Method Information gain CFS, WFS Segmentation URL segmetation Hybrid
Type of
Algorithm/Technique
AdaBoost, sequential
minimization, optimization
Naïve Bayes, logistic
regression, random forest
Support vector machine,
transductive SVM (TSVM)
Neural network,
reinforcement learning
Bayesian
Network algorithm
Advantage
Low false positive and
false negative rates,
overfitting issues, solve as
produced a less error rate
Using greedy forward
search technique of
selected feature sets yield
higher accuracy and
improved training time
Higher accuracy and
higher precision compare
to SVM
Able to recognize
zero-day phishing attack
Able to achieve high
accuracy for fusion of
content-based and
behavior-based approach
Limitation and challenge
Accuracy could be
improved by integrating
k-means and two-step
clustering approach
Slower technique,
degradation of
classification accuracy for
a new type of datasets
Less flexible in terms of
learning
Does not mitigate various
privacy concern and
malicious bots
As feature selection is
content-based, image
content attack can bypass
this approach
Performance Metrics
Error rate—18%, false
positives, false negatives,
accuracy—98.4%
Error rate—1.6%, false
positive rate—1%, false
negative rate—2.7%
Accuracy—91.1%,
precision, recall
Precision—86.7%,
recall—88%,
accuracy—90%,
F-measure—87.3%
False negatives—4.2%,
false positives—4.1%,
precision—96%,
recall—96%, error—4%,
accuracy—96%
Types of ML Classifiers Ensemble Hybrid Single Hybrid Hybrid
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3.3. Privacy Preservation
The prime objective of an ML technique is to extract the needful information from the data by
its classifiers while preserving privacy by masking/hiding the sensitive data from the adversary [68].
Therefore, there is a need to balance these aspects while sensitive data is to be mined. To analyze the
vulnerabilities in the privacy-preservation, several researchers have proposed attacking techniques such
as minimal attacks, background knowledge attacks [69], additive data perturbation and homogeneity
attacks. To combat the types of attacks, many approaches such as l-diversity [70], t-closeness [71],
k-anonymity [72] and double-blinding [73] are represented by the researchers. Even with these types of
approaches, one is not able to prevent the adversaries who already have knowledge about the datasets.
As a result, it is imperative to protect data during the training phase in the ML techniques which are
used for privacy-preserving.
Jia et al. [74] proposed a model that preserves privacy in ML for distributed systems.
It is unreasonable for a distributed system to share the datasets between classifiers due to privacy
concerns. The proposed approach prevents the leakage of private information from the learned model
to other collaborative entities. This work also focuses on the confidentiality of the learning data before
processing. To ensure that data classification is performed successfully without exposing to the tester,
oblivious evaluation of multivariate polynomial approach is applied to the SVM classifier. In [75],
the authors presented an ML algorithm in which estimations are considered as a function of the input
data which can be proclaimed as polynomials of the bounded degree. Therefore, classification and
training are carried out homomorphically on encrypted data. Table 6 reviews the performance of this
scheme. With the quick evolution and wide-spread applications of cloud computing [76], research
works have been published to build an outsourcing computation system over the cloud. However, how
to securely outsource the computation to the cloud is a major challenge. Different solutions have been
proposed which address this issue [77–80]. In the research of ML, Li et al. [76] discussed theoretical
aspects of privacy in the sense of data privacy and privacy in the training model using deep learning.
There is also a great need to focus on the computational cost of data owners to keep it to minimal.
To preserve privacy when multiple actors engage in the deep learning model, before uploading data to
the cloud, a multi-key fully homomorphic encryption (MK-FHE) scheme is proposed. Consequently,
the authors proposed an advanced scheme, hybrid multi-key deep learning training system, which
uses double decryption and fully homomorphic encryption (FHE). The training phase is executed over
the ciphertext under a different public key. Therefore, a theoretical cloud model is able to train a deep
learning model privately with additions and multi-functions which are semantically secure. Though
the homomorphic cryptography has many important applications in operation for ciphertext and
authentication [6,81,82], the efficiency is still a challenge for its practical applications. In [83], it is also
proposed that to preserve privacy in the cloud, a deep computation model can be used for the purpose
of big data feature learning. To protect sensitive data, the model uses Brakerski–Gentry–Vaikunathan
scheme which provides encryption to the private data. This scheme is implemented to the cloud server
in order to effectively enumerate the high order backpropagation algorithm to the encrypted data for
the model training.
The sigmoid function is processed by the proposed technique as a polynomial function to help
secure enumeration of the initiation function of the Brakerski–Gentry–Vaikunathan (BGV) scheme.
The results of the illustrated method depict a 1% to 2% higher error rate and less accuracy as compared
to the non-privacy preserving deep learning computational model. There are also some other related
works that addressed the privacy protection issue in classification [84–87]. Because of the inefficiency
problem with cryptographic solutions, there are also several related works presenting more efficient
techniques including differential privacy [88–90].
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Table 6. Performance comparison of the classifiers [75].
Time for Classifying
Test Vector
Classifier
Computing Time in
the Training Stage
Time for Data
Encryption in the
Training Stage
LM classifier
(encrypted data)
Constant with number of
training vector increases Grows linearly Grows linearly
Fisher’s Linear
Discriminant classifier
(encrypted data)
Constant with number of
training vector increases Grows quadratically Grows linearly
Zhang et al. [91] address a type of regularized observational risk minimization ML problem.
The authors presented that alternate direction method of multiplier approach enables distributed
training over the network and exchanges the result with its neighbors. During the exchange,
the adversary can easily evade the sensitive data which can be protected by using dual variable
perturbation and primal variable perturbation in order to guarantee the dynamic differential privacy.
Furthermore, the authors showed the trade-off between accuracy and privacy. Accuracy is decreased
as the privacy requirement increases further. In [92], the authors illustrated the use of the SVM
privacy-preserving online medical pre-diagnosis framework. The model resides with the service
provider with the main objective that when a query is received from the query engine, privacy and
accuracy should not be compromised in response. To achieve this objective, the model uses non-linear
SVM with lightweight polynomial aggregation techniques and multi-party random masking techniques.
The computational and communicational overhead of the framework needs to be more efficient and
suitable for medical pre-diagnosis services.
The authors in [93] proposed a privacy-preserving protocol using k-means clustering which
provides cryptographic privacy protection for arbitrarily partitioned data. With the proposed method,
two parties can be able to share their data in the arbitrary partition and able to learn k-means clustering
of the shared data without exposing their data to each other. The output of the algorithm assigns 1 to k
cluster numbers to each object. Both the parties learn the assignments if the bject is shared, otherwise,
the assignment is given to the party to which the object belongs to. When the algorithm halts, the final
mean of every cluster is shared by both the parties which then learn absolute final centers. Table 7
presents the review of privacy-preserving techniques and the type of sanitization methods aligned
with the ML algorithm as a supplement to preserve privacy in an existing application.
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Table 7. Review of Privacy Preserving techniques (Notations: OPME-Obvious Evaluation of Multivariate Polynomial, BGV-Brakerski-Gentry-Vaikunathan).
Reference [74] [75] [76] [82] [91] [92] [93]
Application/Domain Distributed system Cryptography Cloud Computing Cloud and big data Network Healthcare Data mining
Type of Algorithm Supportvector machine
Linear means classifier,
Fisher’s Linear
discriminant classifier
Deep learning Deep learning Altering the directionmethod of multipliers
Nonlinear Support vector
machine
K-means
Clustering
Advantage
Preserves privacy of
data classification and
similarity evaluation
Retain confidentiality
of training
and test data
Preserves privacy
of data and
training model
Efficiently deals
with big data
Enables distributed
training over network
collaborative nodes and
guarantees preservation
of privacy at each update
Sensitive health
information not disclosed
during online
prediagnosis services
Provides privacy
preserving over
horizontally,
vertically and
arbitrarily
partitioned data
Limitation and challenge
increasing data,
dimensions require
more polynomials
leads to high
computational cost
Multiple data owners’
data cannot be
handled using a single
ML method without
disclosing data
FHE scheme is
practically not
implemented
Gets excessive
overhead to
accomplish
encryption/decryption
and leads to deploying
more cloud servers
Practical results of PVP
and DVP are not as per
a theoretical analysis
No of support vectors are
fixed up to 60 in real
environment experiments
and overhead found for
the computation
Intermediate
cluster assignment
potentially leak
information
Performance Metrics
Classification
accuracy- 97.21%,
computational cost,
data similarity
Accuracy, training
time Not Applicable
Training time,
classification
accuracy- 87.2%
Empirical loss,
misclassification error
rate, privacy-accuracy
trade-off
Accuracy- 94%,
computational complexity
Computational
complexity
Sanitization methods
as supplement
to ML algorithm
OMPE Homomorphicencryption scheme
Multi-key fully
homomorphic
encryption
BGV homomorphic
encryption scheme
Dual variable
perturbation, Primal
variable perturbation
Polynomial aggregation
techniques, light-weight
multi-party random
masking
Random shares,
secure scalar
product protocol,
Yaos circuit
evaluation
protocol
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3.4. Spam Detection
In the past few years, research interest has been increased for web-based services and systems,
social networking and social media that incorporate large-scale data [94]. Several detection techniques
have been proposed based on their classification. In [95], the authors proposed a technique to
avoid spam distribution. Several algorithms, such as content-based spam detection [96], link-based
spam detection [97], trust-based detection in IoT [98], real-time spam detection [99] and click spam
detection [100] were proposed for spam detection. Spam detection systems have humongous data to
be analyzed which involve multi-dimension attribute space with probably thousands of dimensions
and is vigorous by nature [101]. ML grants tickets due to the adaptive capability to learn the patterns
for classification of spam and no spam [102]. In Table 8, we review some machine learning-based spam
detection techniques.
Chen et al. [103] represented ML streaming spam tweet detection technique which fills the gap
between data feature and model by deriving performance evaluation. To collect the streaming tweets
the author’s used streaming application interface (APIs) with universal resource locator (URL) which
provide 1% access to all public tweets and thus, collected 600 million tweets with the URL. To check
whether the URL is malicious or not for labeling trend, Micro Web Reputation Services are used. For
the feature set preparation, user-based and tweet-based features are extracted. As mentioned in Table 8,
distinct types of ML algorithms are used for performance evaluation and analysis of the impact of
increasing training data, the impact of different sampling methods, the investigation of time-related
data in the form of detection rate and the average values of features.
Meanwhile, the authors in [104] presented a semi-supervised approach to detect the tweet spam
which uses ensemble classifiers. In the framework, four classifiers perform the task with each having
a different method to detect the spam. Classifier 1 uses a blacklist domain detector that checks URL
with the use of questions filter. Classifier 2 analyzes the similarity of the tweet with the use of clusters
and obtains spam and ham tweets. Classifier 3 uses a reliable ham tweet detector which conducts
a content analysis of the posted tweets and text in it. Classifier 4 is preferred for increasing accuracy.
The final labeling using classifier 4 is done as follows:
ltwo4 < −min

MKNN(two)
MNB(two)
MLR(two)
, (1)
where where ltwo4 = final label of classifier 4, two = tweet under observation, M
KNN = k-nearest neighbor
model, MNB = Naive Bayes model, MLR = logistic regression.
At least two models should have the same label to identify a tweet as a ham or spam. After the
final decision is taken using a majority voting approach, the database is updated in the framework.
To make an update more adaptive and efficient, Markov bound-based update model is implemented.
As per the results of the comparison between classifier1 to 4, classifier 2 has a higher precision rate and,
classifier 4 has a higher recall rate and F1 score among all the classifiers.
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Table 8. Review of existing spam detection. Techniques.
Reference [103] [104] [105] [106] [107]
Type of ML Algorithm
Random Forest C4.5,
Naïve Bayes, KNN Bayes
Network, SVM
KNN, Naïve Bias,
Logistic Regression Neural Network
Multinomial Naïve Bayes,
SVM, KNN, Random
Forest Adaboost with
a decision tree
SVM
Advantage Enables real-timespam detection
Framework collects timely
updates in an effective
and adaptive manner
Detect deceptive review
spam by linguistic and
behavioral features
Reduces the overall
error rate
Classifiers can be easily
retrained as characters
and tactics of
sploggers changes
Limitation
Require continuous
training and updating
the data sets in
order to maintain
detection accuracy
As the framework is
tested for tweeter only,
other social media
platform results may
differ as features change
Proposed approach is
compared with
off-the-shelf
classification algorithms
Due to the lack of real
database of SMS a chance
of under performance
during the classification
Continuous updating of
the feature sets is required
Performance Metrics Precision, recall,F-measure—93.6%
Precision—94%,
recall—87.66%, F
score—88.11%
Precision—88.9%,
recall—91.3%, F
values—90.1%
Spams caught—94.47%,
blocked ham,
accuracy—98.88%
Threshold probability,
accuracy—95%
Medium of Spam Tweeter Tweeter Linguistic phrases SMS Blogs
Electronics 2020, 9, 97 20 of 42
Wang et al. [105] explored linguistic and behavioral features to detect the spams. This model’s
attention-based neural network model detects the review spam by distinguishingly using linguistic
and behavioral features. In the feature extraction module, both behavioral features and linguistic
feature vectors are calculated. The feature attention module calculates weighted feature vectors which
are used to predict the spam probability. In [106], the authors presented an approach to detect the spam
from short message service (SMS) using ML algorithms. For the detection and classification, a total of
five models are used: (1) multinomial naïve Bayes; (2) SVM; (3) kth nearest neighbor; (4) random forest
and; (5) AdaBoost with decision trees. As per the results, multinomial naïve Bayes spam detected 94.4%
of spam which is the highest among all the five models. The block hams rate is 0.51% for Naïve Bayes
and AdaBoost with decision trees. The accuracies are 98.88% and 98.86% of the multinomial Naïve
Bayes and SVM respectively which are the highest compared to the other ML algorithms. The medium
of spam through which it gets spread also performs a vital role in the detection with the use of ML
algorithms. Therefore, we review the same for the existing works in Table 8.
3.5. Risk Assessment
Risk assessment provides a comprehensive view of the existing organization or system to obtain
risk consequences, security risk [108] and countermeasures to deal with them. According to [109],
risk assessment techniques are divided into two types of risk: (1) qualitative risk and; (2) quantitative
risk. Qualitative risk is realized from policy direction and quantitative information, stakeholder
knowledge and the history lessons for the system, risk profile and impact [110]. The conclusion
derived from the qualitative assessment is more comprehensive and intellectual. Analytical hierarchy
method [111], factor analysis method [112], a ranking method [110] and the delphi method [113] were
proposed in the past for risk assessment. While quantitative risk is realized by the number of indicators
such as probabilistic risk assessment [114], a number of induced equivalence profiles [115] also has
a close connection with the system operability. Therefore, the result obtained by the quantitative risk
assessment is more concise, clear and reliable. Correlation method [116], time series method [117] and
cluster analysis [118] are the quantitative methods proposed by the researchers. Risk assessment using
both the types of methods in the context of information security is subjective, vague and lacks the
self-learning ability of the models which can be overcome by ML. In Table 9, we show the type of risk
associated with the existing approaches and which algorithm is used to address it.
Eminagaoglu et al. [119] survey information security-related risk with the use of ML to prioritize
the risk. In the first step, they collect qualitative evaluation regarding risk in the institution. In this
survey, a total of six assets, ten threats and nine vulnerabilities are included. Qualitative scores from
the respondents are collected from the questionnaires and it is analyzed by the ML classifiers. Overall
risk can be identified as ‘NO’ if the scale rank of the respondent is from one to three and ‘YES’ if the
scale rank of the respondent is from four to five. Dataset is made of 12 attributes and 1920 instances for
learning the binary classifiers. In [120], the authors develop a tool, called RISKMON, which assesses
the risk of a mobile application and uses an SVM learning algorithm to assess the risk rank.
Guntamukkala et al. [121] proposed an automated scheme based on integrity which helps the users
to obtain online privacy policies. A contextual corpus of the online privacy policies was developed by
the authors for training and testing purposes. With the use of text mining and ML techniques, this
scheme evaluates the completeness of the online privacy policies and assesses the risk quantitatively.
In [122], the authors presented an ML-based mechanism for managing information security with the
use of the security metrics model. This model is used to get the arithmetic values for the security level.
The results of the model are used in manufacturers’ factories for assessing the security systems and for
improving the controlling information risk. The authors in [123] proposed an ML-based approach to
secure data in the cloud environment. In this approach, a Cloudsec module is used to reduce the risk
of potential disclosure of the medical information. The SVM classifier is used to segment the image
and data protection.
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3.6. Malware Detection
In modern days, the most common method to launch attacks on modern computers, as well as
network infrastructures are to use malware (worms, botnets, viruses, trojans). Antivirus software
is the most common tools used to tackle different types of malware. To detect malware, three
complementary, approaches are used: (1) signature-based detection; (2) anomaly-based detection and;
(3) heuristics-based detection. Based on these three types of malware detection approaches we have
analyzed in Table 10.
The signature-based detection approach scans and evaluates the type of its information from
the file and, maps that information to jargons of virus signature that resides in its repository [124].
In this approach, the code is put under observation and approximate runtime behavior/pattern is
predicted to detect the malware. In the static approach, many detection mechanisms are proposed such
as annotated context-free graph [125], disassembled code [126], portable executable binary code [127]
and honeypots [128]. Using this technique dynamic analysis of the malware is difficult to conceal.
The anomaly-based detection approach detects the malware by inspecting its runtime behavior.
Techniques such as file print using n-gram [129], dynamic executable files [130], audit logs [131],
function calls [132] and alert correlation framework [23] are used to detect malware based on its
behavior. This approach can recognize only the presence of malware after malware code has been
executed. Detection of the zero-day malware using this approach is difficult to achieve.
Heuristics-based detection uses ML and data mining techniques for malware detection.
This approach overcomes the disadvantages of both the above malware detection approaches.
This approach addresses the automatic monitoring of malware behavior and attempts to achieve
the desired goal of detection. In the heuristics-based classification, two types of approaches can be
identified: (1) clustering of behavior [133] and; (2) classification of behavior [134]. Das et al. [135]
proposed an approach to capture malicious behaviors based on high-level semantics. The authors
proposed a model based on benign patterns and system call patterns which generates the feature sets
of known malware. Field programmable gate arrays allow the sharing of hardware for classifiers
and runtime detection. Classifiers are used to identify the unknown samples of malware and benign
software. In [136], the authors proposed a mechanism which identifies a malicious application on
smartphones. This mechanism, in the static analysis phase, extracts different feature sets from the
applications manifest and dalvik executable code, as mentioned in Table 10.
Gavrilut et al. [137] proposed an approach in which feature sets are enumerated for each binary
file during training and testing datasets. In the ML framework, features are mapped into one side
perceptrons and kernelized into one side perceptron. The F1 and F2 scores are used to combine the
feature selection and training the ordinary size datasets containing the clean files and malware. In [138],
the authors proposed an approach to identify malicious behavior based on the virtual memory access
patterns in terms of a function call and system call. For system calls, the feature is selected using the
F-score and topmost 10 percentage of F-score features for the training. Memory access in each function
call is restricted to some memory, concluding in histograms with less than non-zero bins, which are
used to train the classifiers.
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Table 9. Review of risk assessment schemes.
Reference [119] [120] [121] [122] [123]
Type of ML Algorithm Random Forest, J48,K-Nearest Neighbor SVM
Linear SVM, K-Nearest
Neighbor, Random Forest SVM
SVM, Fuzzy
c-means clustering
Scheme Importance
Quantifiable risk
assessed in a robust
and reliable way
Automatically measure
the risk induced
by the user
Automated techniques to
enumerate the integrity of
the privacy policy and
notifying the users about
the important sections
Leads towards effective
assistance and assessment
to improve controlling
information risk
Secure environment in
cloud without revealing
sensitive data
Limitation
Fuzzification, statistical,
the numerical method can
improve the performance
Doesn’t address
third-party applications,
unauthorized
access possible
Low degree of
transparency may
generate ambiguous
results
Approach is designed for
a single organization
Pixel texture feature can
be added to enhance
image segmentation
Performance Metrics Accuracy—100% Risk score Accuracy—75% Classifier Margin Accuracy
Type of Risk Qualitative Risk Qualitative Risk Quantitative Risk Quantitative Risk Qualitative Risk
Types of risk
Identification
Security risk of
the institution Android mobile app risk Privacy Policy Risk Information risk
Disclosure of
medical information
Table 10. Malware Detection Analysis (Notations: LR-Logistic Regression, SMO-Sequential Minimal Optimal, MLP- Multi-Layer Perceptron).
Reference [135] [136] [137] [138] [139]
Type of ML Algorithm J48, naïve bayes, SVM,LR, SMO, MLP Linear SVM
Cascade one-sided
perceptron, Cascade
kernelized one-sided
perceptron
Random Forest, Logistic
Regression, SVM SVM
Advantage Able to get the high-levelsemantics of the malware
Able to protect user to
install the application
from an untrusted source
Non-stochastic version
of algorithm enables
parallelized training
process to
increase the speed
High detection accuracy
against the kernel level
rootkits and user level
memory corruption report
Able to identify unknown
families and behavior
which are not present in
the learning corpus
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Table 10. Cont.
Reference [135] [136] [137] [138] [139]
Limitation Unable to detectkernel rootkits
When new code is loaded
dynamic triggering
is not possible
Accuracy is less when
scaling up with the
large datasets
For entire programme,
Epochhistogram size
should be chosen carefully
which requires
human effort
Relies on single program
execution of
malware binary
Performance Metrics
False positive rate,
false negative rate,
Accuracy- 99.7%
False detection, missing
detection, accuracy- 93%
Sensitivity measure value,
specificity measure value,
accuracy measure value-
88.84%, True positives,
false positives
False positives,
true positives
Accuracy- 88%,
confusion matrix
Type(s) of Malware
detected
Backdoors, exploits,
user-level rootkits, exploit,
flooder, hack tools,
net-Worm, Trojan, virus
Fake installer,
DroidKungfu, Palnkton,
opfake, GingerMaster,
BaseBridge, Iconosys,
Knim, FakeDoc, Geinimi,
Adrd, DroidDream,
LinuxLottor, GoldDream,
MobileTx, FakeRun,
Sendpay, Gappusin,
Imlog, SMSreg
Backdoor, hack Tool,
rootkit, Trojan, worms Root kits Worm, backdoors, trojans
Type of features
employed to the
classifiers for detection
Memory, network, file
system, process- related
system calls
Suspicious API calls,
requests permissions,
application components,
filtered intents, network
addresses, hardware
features, used permission,
restricted API calls
Binary type feature set
Architectural events,
memory address,
instruction mix
Frequency of contained
string, string features
(name & list of
key-value pairs)
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3.7. Testing Security Properties
Security properties play a key role in any distributed systems such as military infrastructure,
banking, e-commerce, safety-critical autonomous systems, mobile ad-hoc and more [140]. Many analysis
and modeling techniques have been proposed to make sure the correctness of the security protocol.
These works aimed at validating the protocol specifications. A report [141] shows that errors and
bugs during programming are common in the security-critical system which is to be identified and
addressed properly. Therefore, automatic test drafting and proper execution methods are enticing
to test real-time response and protocols in the security flaws. In addition, black-box testing is also
another approach to verify specification and conformance of the protocol implementation, automation
and formal modeling [142]. Existing testing techniques depend on human insights and, their skills
and strategies, while traditional techniques do not deal beyond what is detailed in the specifications.
With the use of ML, accurate testing of the properties would be possible. Vardhan et al. [143] proposed
finite a state machine communicating over unbounded first-in–first-out (FIFO) channels with the use
of an ML technique in order to verify the safety properties. The idea of the approach is to learn the set
of reachable states rather than computing them by assigning transition relations.
ML techniques learn the reachable first states and then verify the safety properties by checking
the unsafe states in the reachable states. In the case that the arrangement of states learned closed under
the change connection infers. The scholarly arrangement of states contains every single reachable set
which does not contain any unsafe state, at that point, it is inferred that framework fulfills the security
properties. For learning positive and negative samples, RPNI algorithm [144] is used. Shu et al. [145]
proposed a new ML technique to automatically test protocol implementation security characteristics.
The security protocol model is a symbolic parameterized extended finite-state model and, message
confidentiality is a property to be investigated with the help of this model. If the attacker can obtain
a confidential message with the use of prior knowledge, there is a security violation of the proposed
model. The goal of the message confidentiality testing is to discover the security contravention with
the help of black-box testing. At the time of testing a component of the model is kept under test and
so is the anticipated behavior of the component. The behavior is represented in terms of finite state
machine (FSM) trace which calculates the estimation, and updates based on the learning algorithm
that covers the target implementation. After forming the new estimation, the validation algorithm is
executed which calculates the reachability of the graph and searches for the security violation. If the
violation is confirmed in the security properties that means false positive introduced and experiment
trace on the black box and if the trace is confirmed then it will be a FAIL claim. If no violation is
found and evaluation is similar to the black box, the process terminates with the PASS result. In [146],
the authors presented a formal fuzz testing and ML-based communication protocol for security flaws
detection. Authors adopt the FSM protocol model and examine two conventional techniques for the
protocol synthesis: (1) active black box-checking algorithm; (2) passive trace minimization algorithm.
As discussed earlier, the behavior of FSM is updated as more traces are covered by the supervised
ML algorithm. To take control of input–output (I/O), a proxy has been developed which connects the
client to the server. In the login phase, the model has been synthesized with the protocol involving
approximately 50 states and 70 transitions. The aim of the fuzzy function is to search the series of
inputs that crash the client process.
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4. Review of Adversarial Attacks on Machine Learning
4.1. Machine Learning Vulnerability Analysis and Threat Model
We quote the definition of software vulnerability described by Mohammad et al. in [147]:
“Software vulnerability is an instance of a flaw, caused by a mistake in the design, development
or configuration of software such that it can be exploited to violate some explicit or implicit
security policy.”
Vulnerability is the root cause of security and privacy breach of any system. In this analysis,
we describe different attacks in terms of security and privacy perspective.ML techniques are broadly
applied in security and privacy-oriented operations such as malware detection, pattern recognition,
spam detection, pattern recognition, homomorphic encryption [148,149] and privacy preservation and
statistical analysis of a database [150,151]. ML has become a promising approach in order to provide
automation in security or privacy breach detection. As above mentioned, from the perspective of
security and privacy, it is impossible to make a system that addresses these two aspects. ML techniques
also have weaknesses and vulnerabilities. Therefore, we have demonstrated an attack surface as well
as the possible scope of the defense in the ML life cycle in Figure 3. It is designed to illustrate the
characteristics of the possible attacks under adversarial settings. While the middle layer in Figure 3
represents data pre-processing, feature extraction and model training phase of the ML classifier. The top
layer demonstrates the countermeasures over the adversarial setting for the ML classifier.
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As demonstrated in Figure 3 in the bottom layer, the attacker can access the ML classifier by
false data injection and stealthy channel attacks. The training phase is vital for ML classifiers to
realize a specific classification with respect to a dataset. The poisoning attack has rattled the integrity
and availability of the ML models by injecting the adversarial samples into the training datasets.
In a real-world scenario, ML-based system training data is highly protected with confidentiality
therefore, homomorphic scheme is one that can transform the one feature vector entity into another
feature vector entity. The evasion attacks are proposed to imperil the ML model security by modifying
key features of the ML algorithm and gain the authority of the model. After deployment of the
ML classifier attacker may exploit a stolen model to detect negotiable adversarial models that can
deceive classification by the authentic model. For this activity, attackers mount prediction application
program interfaces by sending repeated queries. In the inference phase, according to the degree of
understanding knowledge in the attacker model, it is classified into two groups, particularly white-box,
and black-box attack. Sophisticated and strong attackers can launch a white-box attack by downloading
and accessing the ML models and other data, while black-box attacks can launch by weak attackers by
using APIs and filling inputs.
In the top layer of Figure 3, the possible defensive techniques for the ML lifecycle over the
adversarial techniques to defend the ML classifiers in various stages are demonstrated. Data sanitization
is one of the approaches to protect the purity of the training data by isolating the adversarial sample
from the original sample and reject the adversarial sample. Another adequate technique to improve
the robustness and security of the algorithms can be used which evenly distributed feature weights
of classifiers. Also to improve the robustness of the algorithm retraining the ML classifiers with the
adversarial samples so that newly trained classifiers are able to detect anomalies in the testing phase.
While security assessment scheme involves a risk assessment scheme involves in Table 9 in order to
assess the security of ML classifiers to protect the possible threats against the attacker. With security
assessment in the big data era, confidentiality and the privacy of the data is also an essential and
vital concern in the defense techniques. Therefore to provide data privacy with the existence of the
sophisticated attacks differential privacy and homomorphic encryption techniques are used.
4.1.1. Categorizing of Attack Properties
In this section, we demonstrate different properties of the attack and we organized accordingly in
ML perspective in Figure 4.
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1. Influence
Influence property describes the attacker’s potential to influence the machine level model at each
level. Causative attacks to leverage the training data by taking control of the datasets exploratory
attacks do not affect the training data but influence the classifier by aiming misclassification in oﬄine
mode or using probing techniques.
2. Specificity
Specificity property indicates the objective of the attacker’s intention over the ML classifiers.
Targeted attacks aim at the classifiers that degrade classifiers’ performance when particular conditions
are fulfilled. Indiscriminate attacks cause damage to the classifiers in an assorted manner with a large
number of instances.
3. Security Violation
Security property shows the level of security violations done by the attackers. Integrity attacks
allow a malicious instance as a genial instance by poisoning the filters. This gives incorrect results
in the form of a false negative rate. Availability attacks are caused by DoS attacks in which genial
instances are identified as malicious by poisoning the filters and as a result, it will provide incorrect
false-positive rates.
To get an idea about the security in ML, one should address primary issues in adversarial settings
with a proactive approach [152]:
• Diagnose probable vulnerabilities during training and classification in the machine
learning algorithm.
• Model the types of attacks that coincide in order to recognize different threats and to evaluate the
impact on the victim.
The results observed in [152] urge corrective measures to enhance the security of ML algorithms
and training data against adversarial attacks.
A proactive approach to ML algorithms needs reverse engineering as shown in Figure 5.
Such an approach does not represent obscure or evolving parts of the adversary. Without a doubt,
it can prompt an enhanced level of security by deferring each progression of the receptive weapons
contest. Since its constraints ought to sensitize the foe to apply more noteworthy exertion to discover
new vulnerabilities.
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In Figure 6, we describe the level of the scenario for the classifier in the context of the training
dataset, feature sets, and algorithm of the classifiers. If we think with the adversarial point of view,
knowledge is required based on these three evasion scenarios. Therefore, based on these scenarios,
the other four scenarios can be concluded as shown in Figure 6. We align each scenario with Table 11.
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Attacker Type
Weak Attacker Strong Attacker Sophisticated Attacker
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FC •
FTC •
4.1.2. Attackers’ Category
For any kind of attacker on any kind of system, there is a requirement of comprehensive knowledge,
phase of attack contamination and budgets for modeling the proper attacks. From ML point of view, as
described in [154], attackers’ familiarity with the training data, feature sets, decision function, learning
algorithm, and parameters varies from system to system. In order to benchmark the ML model during
the designing and development phase, we have considered a white box testing scenario for which we
have defined the role of sophisticated attacker to map with the evasion scenario in the model.
1. Weak attacker
A weak attacker does not have the knowledge of the statistical properties of training or labels.
This kind of attacker tries to poison the training datasets by adding fake labels. Thus, a weak attacker
can poison the properties feature sets and training sets in the classifier system.
2. Strong attacker
This type of attacker can access the dataset and influence features of the datasets. This category of
the attacker cannot influence directly on classifiers, rather it uses publicly available malware poisoning.
A strong attacker can poison properties such as feature set, training data, and feature set and training
set in the classifier.
3. Sophisticated attacker
A sophisticated attacker has knowledge of the algorithm and parameters to run that algorithm.
This type of attacker h s sufficient economic resources and, c n manipul te all t e training datasets
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and feature data with the use of malware. This attacker can influence all types of evasion scenarios, as
shown in Table 11.
4.1.3. Attacks on Machine Learning by its Security Property
This section is described based on the taxonomy of the attack properties bifurcate different types
of attacks possible on the machine learning classifiers.
1. Causative Attacks
In causative attacks, an adversary impacts the training data which drives towards misclassification.
On training, a data attacker has a different type of impact from capricious dominations to prejudice
dominations, over some portion of information generation [155].
A. Causative Integrity Attack
In this type of attack, an adversary makes spam slip past the classifier as a false negative by
employing control overtraining. An example of a causative integrity attack is the label flipping attack.
The goal of a causative integrity attack is to include false labels into training data by flipping the
labels. Attackers are able to modify legitimate labels and introduce them as malicious and vice-versa
in this attack. To do this, common methods are used to collect malware data with the use of honeypots
and botnets.
Attack scenario: in [156], the authors proposed a model of adverse flipping attack in which
they assumed that attackers are able to manipulate labels maliciously to mislead the classifier over
the non-malicious datasets. Thus, it preserves its generalization on malicious datasets. By doing so,
the hyperplane of the classifiers will be migrated and as a result, the attacker deviates generalization
of the classifiers from non-malicious data sets. For modeling attacks, the authors used real-world
datasets and synthetic data sets. For synthetic datasets, 200 training samples were randomly selected
and, test errors are performed on flip L = 20 labels and disjointed set of 800 samples from the training
data. On synthetic datasets, for decision boundary, linear and radial basis function (RBF) kernel is
used with a value of C = 1 (soft margin of influence control for support vector) and γ = 0.5 (similarity
measure). When the RBF kernel is applied, the efficiency of SVM is influenced by carefully choosing
labels from the training datasets. Therefore, it is depicted that a change in the SVM algorithm has
a notable impact on the results. Thus, to get the maximum impact in the results from the attackers’
perspective, it requires the knowledge of training datasets.
B. Causative Availability Attack
The main goal of the causative availability attack is to use token-based features to train the
classifiers maliciously. In the attackers’ perspective, they can add malicious features into the training
instance which causes filter blockage of non-malicious features in this type of attack.
• Attack scenario: the authors in [157] discussed attacks against a spam Byers in terms of
indiscriminate and targeted dictionary attacks. In indiscriminate dictionary attacks, the email
contains words, which are liable to show authentic messages. Accordingly, these types of email
words are incorporated into information preparation and as a result, the classifiers will classify
authentic emails as spam. While in the targeted dictionary attacks, the adversary considers the
knowledge of a particular email instead of reading it from the recipient. Hence, the impact is
limited because it is word specific. In [158], the authors presented allergy attacks on the autograph
worm generation system. This attack is divided into two phases. In the beginning, based on the
behavioral patterns during scanning, it distinguishes tainted nodes from the network. In the
second phase, it analyses the traffic from tainted nodes and, deduces the blocking rules from the
observed behavioral patterns. Thus, the autograph is persuaded by the tainted node, which is
contaminated by scanning the network. The tainted node sends forged packets which results in
the DoS and blocking non-malicious access from the autograph.
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2. Exploratory Attack
During the exploratory attack, an adversary modifies the spam structure with the use of
polymorphic, metamorphic or rootkits that use different types of obfuscation techniques. These
types of scenario attacks avoid the direct influence of the classifier on itself. These types of attacks are
either targeted or indiscriminate.
A. Exploratory Integrity Attack
The goal of an exploratory integrity attack is to mask intrusion by resembling the statistical
properties of network traffic in the training data is calculated by the classifiers. Adversaries have
a direct influence on the ML classifiers as the sophisticated types of attackers have a perfect knowledge
of classifiers while the other attackers have knowledge of feature representation and types of classifiers,
but it does not know whether classifiers have learned; thus, it will not be able to calculate the
discrimination function.
• Attack scenario: in [159], the authors discussed a model of mimicry attack with the use of a gradient
descent method over the neural network and SVM classifier. The authors modeled attacks from
both sophisticated and strong attackers’ point of view. Feature values will be changed by the
attacks prior to the attack point flip labels. This attack is applied to handwritten grayscale images
using the SVM classifier and to portable document format (PDF) document using neural network
and SVM classifier. The authors used the feature for malicious PDF, which was extracted in [160].
In handwritten images, authors have considered perfect knowledge scenarios from the attacker’s
point of view. The grayscale pixel values were changed to modify the handwritten digits. In this attack,
the targeted classifier was an SVM consisting of linear kernel functionality. The authors chose 100
random training samples for applying the attack. In the given gradient attack, digit ‘3’ is misclassified
as digit ‘7’. Without using a mimic component λ = 0, gradient descent quickly gets decreased, but not
able to classify digit ‘3’ as digit ‘7’ after 500 iterations. While using a mimic component λ = 10, gradient
the attacked image precisely resemble due to mimicry term more favorable to the target class. So when
mimic is used the discriminant function g(x) tends to decrease more gracefully.
For the PDF sample, the authors have modeled attacks with attackers having perfect or limited
knowledge. For a limited knowledge case, the false-negative rate computed corresponds to false
postives = 0.5%. When the false-negative rate increases with dmax (maximum distance from the
original attack sample dmax  [0, 50]), PDF is progressively modified. When dmax = 0, there is no
change in false-negative rate as PDF is unmodified. For linear SVM, without the use of mimicry
component (λ = 0) in perfect knowledge and limited knowledge cases to 1 to 0.75 respectively with
5 to 10 modification. For RBF kernel with mimicry component (λ = 0), false-negative rates for PK
and LK cases are 0.8 and 0.6 respectively with 15 modifications. While comparing to both, SVM and
neural networks, the neural network is more robust against the proposed attack. Furthermore, in the
absence of mimicry component (λ = 0), the false-negative rate is 0.2 with 50 modifications for a neural
network in PK scenario. While in the presence of mimicry component (λ = 500) for a linear SVM,
false-negative rate increases slowly as compared to RBF kernel and neural network, for both PK and LK
scenarios. The neural network is more vulnerable in the presence of mimicry component (λ = 500) as
false-negative rate 1 requires only 20 modifications in PK scenario and false-negative rate 0.5 requires
50 modifications in LK scenario.
B. Exploratory Availability Attack
The main goal of an exploratory availability attack is to set of points that are misclassified by the
learner to launch a DoS attack. Attackers require knowledge of production learners during the attack.
• Attack scenario: in [147], the authors proposed a mechanism for threatening statistical traffic
analysis by emulating the class of traffic which mimics another class. This method focuses on the
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detection system. The packets are modified in real-time which reduces the accuracy of classifiers.
Classifiers achieve the accuracy of 98.4% on unmodified data, while it is reduced to just 4.5% after
the attack.
4.2. Practical Feasibility of Attacks
Attacks describe in Section 4.1.3, highlights several practical feasibility and consideration that
must be addressed to craft effective attack against a machine learning system. As mentioned above that
weak attackers do not have knowledge about the statistical properties of the training data or model.
While strong attackers don’t have knowledge about classifiers. This type of attacker can practically craft
black box types of attacks. The main strategy followed by the weak attacker in these types of attacks is
a substitute synthetic dataset to drive the classifier for misclassification [161]. Weak attacker embeds
a portion of benign code into a malicious app by misusing Manifest.xml file configuration for any
malware detection application. By such type of practice as mentioned in [162], AndroidManifest.xml
file of Polaris Office misclassified as a benign file. Strong attacker mainly influences the feature sets
such as the address of the designated system is challenging to spoof. Xiao et al. [163], represent
the attack in which by injecting a maximum number of poisoning point into training data sets and
maximize the classification error of the algorithm. While sophisticated attackers have knowledge of
algorithm and parameters to run the algorithm. Such type of practice is regularly used in the lab for
the penetration testing of the machine learning classifiers. As mentioned in [164], using dynamic code
loading modify the runtime behavior of the applications and mislead the classifiers.
4.3. Adversarial Defense Techniques
In the defense for the ML classifiers, designers proposed two types of mechanisms that is proactive
defense and reactive defense [152]. In the proactive designer select any one of the adversarial models.
Then adversary launches the penetration testing on the model and analyses the impact of the attacks.
After the designer proposed countermeasures towards adversary while designing a classifier. While in
the reactive defense designer analyses new added samples and corresponding attack results after the
attack over the ML classifier. Then the designer proposed defending mechanisms for the ML classifiers.
To take countermeasures in the training phase designer try to ensure data purity and improve the
robustness of the algorithm [165]. While countermeasures in the inference phase only focus on the
robustness of the classifier. In [166] proposed an ensemble method, which improves the robustness of
the classifier by fulfilling the availability/integrity type of security property. To provide security and
privacy of the data cryptographic technology and differential privacy is used [167,168]. These schemes
ensure blocking data leakage and reduce sensitive outputs of the classifiers, which are the impact on
data security and privacy. Therefore, by using these types of adversarial defense techniques designer
is defending the ML classifiers. In Table 12, we represent the review of both proactive and reactive
types of defense techniques.
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Table 12. Adversarial defense techniques analysis over security properties (reject on negative impact (RONI)).
Reference [165] [166] [167] [168] [169] [170]
Technique Data Sanitization Ensemble method Differential privacy Holomorphicencryption Adversarial training Defense distillation
Type of
security property
Protect availability
and integrity
Protect availability
and integrity
Preserve privacy and
integrity
Preserve privacy and
integrity
Protect availability
and integrity
Protect availability
and integrity
Advantage
Based on RONI
sanitization rejects
samples which
include a negative
impact
Ensemble the training
data with
perturbations
transferred from other
models
Give protection
against strong
attacker over training
mechanism and
model parameters
Able to protect data
privacy multi-party
computational
environment and
directly process
encrypted data
Provides the
examples of
adversarial training
and labels during
training to identify
adversarial in future
Reduces sensitivity of
networks to
adversarial
manipulation of their
inputs also leverages
the resilience to
adversarial crafting
Disadvantage
RONI defense fails to
detect a focused
attack
Not considered black
box adversaries that
attack a model via
other means
Differential privacy
accuracyis less
This approach is
designed only for the
horizontal data
objects only
Ensemble approach
provides limited
resistance to
adversarial
perturbation
Add only restricted
amount of features
also gradually cannot
change the features
Type of approach Reactive Reactive Proactive Proactive Reactive Proactive
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5. Conclusions
New threats caused by cyber-attacks can damage critical data infrastructure because of machine
learning in the security applications highly dependent on the data quality. Using machine learning-based
methods in security applications faces a challenge the performance of recognizing an adversarial
sample by collecting and predicting adversarial samples. Hence we conclude that the new models are
becoming a research point from attacker and designer perspective. With the rapid increase in security
events security in machine learning-based decision systems in adversarial environments opens a door
for the new research area. In some cases, malicious users can simply increase false-negative rates and
minimizing false-positive rates by a proportional amount, cleverly make sure that the overall error rate
remains the same and attack is unnoticed which can give attackers some leverage in sophisticated
attacks. This kind of issue there needs to be explored to detect attacks efficiently on ML-based systems.
Regardless of the data privacy field, great advancement in existing methods of data privacy suffer
from modest performance due to complex operations on a huge number of parameters of machine
learning algorithms. Therefore extremely efficient privacy-preserving methods need to be investigated
in the adversarial environmental setting. Observation made related performance tradeoff between
accuracy and scalability for the machine learning classifiers. For example for any security application
designing informal decision made on which approach to use when. But even though having more
weak labels does not imply that classifiers’ accuracy will eventually reach a precise accuracy. Therefore,
it is worth to infuse humans or utilizing transfer learning to make additional changes. This type of
decision is made by an experiment, but an important question is whether, overall, there is a need to
design and craft secure machine learning algorithms that way which can balance three aspects that are
performance overhead, security optimization, and performance generalization.
Few conventional techniques rely on known threats due to the precedence of vulnerabilities.
Therefore, with the evolvement of the threats, there is a need to upgrade the detection techniques
to counter the new generation threats. In this survey, we present the taxonomy of threats that infer
the overall characteristics, structure, types and spreading mechanism of different types of malware.
We discuss different types of security applications where machine learning is used to leverage the
fulfillment of current world requirements from security and privacy perspective. We discuss and
compare different types of machine learning models from the security and privacy point of view.
Moreover, we highlight possible limitations of the proposed approaches and challenges involved with
the same. We include scenarios of evasion for a machine learning system from the adversarial point of
view. In addition, we align the attack scenarios on the machine learning classifiers with the attackers’
knowledge. Furthermore, we illustrate the attacks aimed at the machine learning classifiers and
algorithms that can cause damage in the context of the security properties of the model. Moreover, we
review defense techniques for the machine learning classifiers which preserves the machine learning
security properties. We find that sophisticated attacks can exploit the machine learning-based malware
detectors with extreme severity. Therefore, it is imperative to protect machine learning-based security
solutions and address their vulnerabilities. The sole purpose of this survey is to direct the security
researchers in devising more secure, reliable and effective models.
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